Morgan, W. Scott. History of the Wheel and Alliance and the Impending Revolution . Ft. Scott, KS: J.H. Rice & Sons, 1891. [format: book], [genre: history; narrative; proceedings]. Permission: Northern Illinois University
Persistent link to this document: http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/file.php?file=morgan.html

THE above very suggestive headings appeared in the St. Louis Republic of June 29th, 1888, above the following article:

"It became quite plain in the morning that the suspicion entertained for several days, that the old bull crowd was getting out of its wheat, was correct. Frank Kennett, of Jones, Kennett & Hopkins, whose buying was the most noticeable for a fortnight, said: "We have given over trying to buy wheat up. It is like trying to buy up the atmosphere, and makes absolutely no impression. Those who thought that there were really two sides to the market lost a good deal of money."

"There was a good deal of rain through the Southeastern States, over an inch in a good many sections, and the crowd confidently expected an advance on the wet harvest news. Enormous selling by Hutchinson and moderate selling by Cudahy and Linn set the price back at once. This, too, was in spite of better cables, and fair clearances. The best buying of the day was by Milmine, Bodinan &Co., who took at least 500,000 bushels of presumably long

wheat. McCormick &Co. were on the same side; but they were credited simply with covering short sales, and consequently exerted less influence. Hutchinson's sales were over 1,000,000 certainly; some thought over 2,000,000 bushels. The market was very much under the influence of the big men early; very little under their influence later in the day. The break of 1 cent in the morning was caused by the sales of the leaders — Hutchinson, Cudahy, Linn and others — and by the operations of the scalpers, who followed them. The rally was on a commission house buying. New York, especially, was in a bull mood; so was St. Louis. It closed ½ cent higher for July than it opened, while Chicago closed actually a little under its opening. The last cables were decidedly stronger, closing at an advance of pence at Liverpool. July wheat opened at 80 ⅛ cents, sold down to 79 cents, and up to 80 cents, and closed at 79 ⅞ cents. August opened at ¼ cent under, but closed ¼ cent over July.

"Corn dropped 1c. and looked shaky again for awhile. An attack was made on it by Cudahy and some other bears and at a critical time the Friday's estimates came in and showed up large, 220 cars. Cudahy's sales were through Schwartz, Dupee & Co., and his own house. They and the big estimates took July from 48 ¾ to 47 ⅝ c. The close was at 48c. August was at 1c. premium. New York, however, was strong on corn; closing for July ¾ c. above the opening. Of the 200,000 bushels received there all were sold for consumption and nearly all of it for export. St. Louis was also strong, and closed ⅛ c. above the opening. The receipts (144 cars) were about 50 cars under the expectations. The estimates for Friday, however, more than offset these. It was reported that the railroads predicted a free movement, judging from the

demand on them for cars during the early part of July."

Articles similar to the above are of frequent occurence in our daily papers. Two or three men in Chicago control the prices of beef, pork and lard; a half dozen fix the price of wheat, corn and oats. Not one-tenth part of the wheat that is bought and sold on 'change ever had existence. It is simply gambling in prices. The "bulls" are those who, by buying all the available supply of any product render it scarce and enhance the price. This is done when they have contracted for large deliveries of corn, wheat, oats, or any other product in which they are dealing, at a stated price. It is then to the interest of the buyer to put the price above the one set for delivery. If he is successful, the seller must pay to the buyer the excess above the price agreed upon. If the price is lower than the one agreed upon, then the buyer must pay to the seller the difference between the market price and the one he agreed to pay.

To illustrate: A sells B 50,000 bushels of January wheat — that is, wheat to be delivered in January — at 80 cents per bushel. It is now B's interest to force the January price of wheat above 80 cents. Others have also bought wheat and their interest is identical with B's. They therefore form a pool and buy up all the available wheat in the market. This produces a stringency in the market; the price goes up and the sellers (the bears) instead of being able to fill their contracts at 80 cents are compelled to pay 95. Or, in other words, they give 15 cents per bushel to be relieved from filling their contract, and B makes a profit of 15 cents per bushel, or $7,500 on an imaginary deal. In plain English, A bets that the price of wheat in January will not exceed So cents, and B bets that it will. A goes to work and attempts to keep the price down by having all the wheat put on the market for sale he can in order to keep the price down, while B

by buying all the wheat on the market, aims to run the price up. The stakes are the difference between the market price and the price agreed upon.

Wheat may be a good price to-day and the farmer who has been holding for better prices will start his wheat to market, but by the time it reaches there the "bulls" may have become "bears," and "unloaded" their supply upon the market, causing a rapid decline of prices that sweeps away all the profits of the farmer and country grain dealer. The system is fraught with such apparent evils that the only wonder is that it is tolerated at all, and we presume it would not be in an uncivilized country.

The following note of warning and manly protest from the pen of T. V. Powderly recently appeared in the Journal of United Labor:

"Congress is in session quarreling over a tariff bill to regulate the price of articles that come to our shores in ships, and Hutchinson is raising the price on that which is native to the soil, and which every workingman is most in need of, but no means are taken by Congress to put an end to Hutchinson and his methods.

"Is there any remedy for this condition of affairs? Can we put an end to this system of robbery without revolution? If there is a way it should be pointed out quickly, for men will not be turned out of work on the eve of winter, and be told at the same time that the source of revenue is cut off, that the price of food has gone up. Human nature will not stand everything, and it should not be asked to. * * *

"This is a good season to hunt bears. They are too plenty, and have invaded the haunts of civilization. We must get rid of them.

"It will not do to place a boycott on wheat or sugar, but we can put an eternal boycott on the men who gamble in these articles. Write to the President of the United

States to send a message to Congress demanding that these institutions that gamble in food be abolished; that trusts be abolished. Then write to your present Congressman and Senator at Washington, and ask that they at once take notice of this crying evil and legislate it out of existence. Go to those who are candidates for Congress and exact pledges from them to abolish these institutions in case the present session does not do its duty. The present Congress has spent nearly a year in skirmishing for points on which to carry the next election, while the interests of the people are going to the Devil. It is time to put a stop to it, and the workingmen of the United States should speak out in thunder tones to them on this great issue."

It is certainly in the interests of the people that gambling in the prices of the necessaries of life and the unlawful combinations against the natural laws of trade should be prohibited. That it is not only permitted but considered respectable and engaged in by members of the church — professors of Christianity — is a serious reflection upon the intelligence and morality of our civil institutions. That a man who has been publicly connected with this business for years, and is notorious for his success in grain gambling, could be elected as chief magistrate ^[2] of the great commonwealth of Missouri, reflects little credit on the party which is responsible for his election — a party, too, that claims to be the "party of the people." All pretensions to reform accompanied by such action are the merest shams, and the sooner the masses of the people realize this fact the better it will be for the Republic.

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