Decision of the Supreme Court in the

Dred Scott Case. New York Times

The Ordinance of 1787 and the Missouri Compromise Declared Unconstitutional

MR. BUCHANAN'S CABINET.

Washington,

Friday, March 6,

The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case was delivered by Chief Justice Taney. It was a full and elaborate statement of the views of the Court. They have decided the following important points:

First- Negroes, whether slaves or free, that is, men of the African race, are not citizens of the United States by the Constitution.

Second- The Ordinance of 1787 had no independent constitutional force or legal effect subsequently to the adoption of the Constitution, and could not operate of itself to confer freedom or citizenship within the Northwest Territory on negroes not citizens by the Constitution. . '

Third- The provisions of' tbe Act of 1829, commonly called the Missouri Compromise, in so far as it un-undertook to include negro slavery from, and communicate freedom and citizenship to, negroes in the northern part of the Louisiana opinion, was a Legislative act exceeding the powers of congress, and void, and of no legal effect to that end. In deciding these main points, the Supreme Court determined the following incidental points: .

First—The expression "territory and other prop-erty" of the Union, in the Constitution, applies ^"in terms" only to such territory as the Union possessed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.

Second—The rights of citizens of the United States emigrating into any Federal territory, and the power of the Federal Government there depend on the general provisions of' the Constitution, which de-fines in this, as in all other respects, the power of Congress.

Third-- As Congress does not possess power itself to make enactments relative the persons or property of citizens of the United States, in a Federal Terri-tory, other than such as the Constitution confers, so it cannot constitutionally deligate any such powers to a Territorial Government, organized by it under the constitution.

Fourth--The legal condition of a slave in the State of Missouri is not affected by the temporary sojourn of such slave in any other State, but on his return his condition still depends on the laws of Missouri. As the plaintiff was not a citizen of Missouri, he, therefore, could not sue in the Courts of the United States. The suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The delivery of this opinion occupied about three hours, and was listened to with profound attention by a crowded Court-room. Among the auditors were gentlemen of eminent legal ability, and a due proportion of ladies.

Judge Nelson stated the merits of the case. The question was whether or not the removal of Scott from Missouri with his master to Illinois, with a view to temporary residence there, worked his emancipation. He maintained that the question depended wholly on the law of Missouri, and for that reason the judgement of the Court below should be affirmed.

Judge Catron believed the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case. He argued that Congress could not do directly what it could not do indirectly. If it could exclude one species of property, it could exclude another. With

regard to the Territories coded, Congress could govern them only with the restrictions of the States which ceded them; and the Missouri act of 1820 violated the leading features of the Constitution, and was therefore void. He concurred with his brother

Judges, that Scott is a slave, and was so when this suit was brought.

Several other Judges are to deliver their views tomorrow.

Slavery inthe Territories Important Decision of the Supreme Court.

New York Times

The most important decision ever made by the Supreme Court of the United States was pronounced yesterday,—and a summary of its leading points will be found among our telegraphic dispatches. That supreme tribunal of the land decides that the Ordinance of 1787—so far as it prohibited Slavery from the North-west Territory, was unconstitutional:—-that the Missouri Compromise, so far as it excluded Slavery from the Louisiana Territory north of 36° 30', was unconstitutional;—that Congress had no power to prohibit Slavery from any portion of the Federal territory, nor to authorize the inhabitants thereof to do so;—that negroes are not citizens of the United States; --and that the residence of a slave in a free State does not affect his legal condition upon his return to a State where Slavery is allowed by law. . Thus at one blow all the legislation of the country, from the formation of the Constitution to the present day, against the extension of Slavery, is swept away;—and the Supreme Court decides that the Constitution ex proprio vigore carries SIavery into every portion of the federal territory, or what amounts to the same thing, authorizes the Slaveholder to carry it thither, in spite of Congress or the will of its inhabitants. The power of Congress over the subject, and the modern doctrine of Popular Sovereignty in the Territories, are alike repu-diated and annulled. It is not in the power, either of the Federal Government or of the Fed-eral Territories to exclude Slavery therefrom.

It is impossible to exaggerate the import-ance of this decison. It gives the sanction of constitutional law to the practical revolution which for some years past has been going on in the policy of the Government upon this subject, and engrafts upon this theory of the Re-public the doctrines upon which Mr. Calhoun labored in vain, during the last years of his life, to rally even the people of the Southern States. But one more decision is needed to make Slavery the actual law of the whole Republic, and render its prohibition in any of the states null and void ;—and this we shall probably have when the Lemmon case reaches the same tribunal which has just reversed the whole policy of the Government in regard to the Territories.

No popular revolution will follow this decision, startling as it will be to the opinions and principles of three-fourths of the people of the United States. It will be accepted as the authoritative exposition of the Constitution, and regarded by all departments of the Government and by the people as the law of the land. No issue wilI probably ever be made upon it before the people,—for the practical settlement of the question will anticipate any political result that might be reached. But it will profoundly affect the public mind in regard to the general question of Slavery, and will change the issues which must inevitably come up sooner or later in reference to it. That it will render them less absorbing in their nature, less disturbing in their progress or more safe and peaceful in their results, no one who knows anything of the temper of the American people can for a moment believe.

Washington, Feb 7.

Chief-Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of the Court said, that this case, after argument at the last term, was directed to be re-argued at the present term, owing to difference of opinion existing among members of the Court, and in order to give the subject more mature deliberation.

There were two leading questions: First, had the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Missouri jurisdiction in the case; and, if it had jurisdiction, was its decision erroneous or not?

The defendant denied, by plea in abatement, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States on the ground that the plaintiff "is a negro of African descent, his ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as slaves," and therefore the plaintiff "is not a citizen of the State of Missouri." To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the Court sustained the demurrer. Thereupon the defendant pleaded over, and justified the trespass on the ground that the plaintiff and his family were his negro slaves; and a statement of facts, agreed to by both parties, was read in evidence.

The Chief Justice, having stated the facts in the case, proceeded (in a tone of voice almost inaudible) to say, in substance, that the question first to be decided was, whether the plaintiff was entitled to sue in a Court of the United States. This was a peculiar question, and for the first time brought before the Court under such circumstances; but it had been brought here, and it was the duty of the Court to meet and to decide it. The question was simply this, can a negro, whose ancestors were imported and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and, as such, become entitled to all the rights and immunities of a citizen, one of which rights is suing in the courts of the United States in cases therein specified? In discussing this question we must not confound the rights of a citizen which a State may confer within its own limits, with the rights of a citizen within the limits of the United States. No one can be a citizen of the United States unless under the provisions of the Constitution; but it does not follow that a man, being a citizen of one State, must be recognised as such by every State in the Union. He may be a citizen in one State and not recognised as such in another. Previous to the adoption of the Constitution, every State might confer the character of a citizen, and endow a man with all the rights pertaining to it. This was confined to the boundaries of a State, and gave him no rights beyond its limits. Nor have the several States surrendered this power by the adoption of the Constitution. Every State may confer the right upon an alien or on any other class or description of persons, who would, to all intents and purposes, be a citizen of the State, but not a citizen in the sense used in the Constitution of the United States. He would not thereby become a citizen of the United States, and, therefore, could not sue in any Court in the United States, nor could he enjoy the immunities of a citizen in the other States. His rights would be confined strictly to his own State. The Constitution gives Congress the power to establish "a uniform rule of naturalization;" consequently, no State, by naturalizing an alien, could confer upon him the rights and immunities of all the States under the General Government. It is very clear, therefore, that no State can, by any act, introduce a new member into the political Union created by the Constitution. The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution of the United States in relation to personal rights to which a citizen of a State is entitled, embraced negroes of the African race, at that time in the county, or afterwards imported, or made free from any State: an whether it is in the power of any State to make such a one a citizen of the State, and endow him with full citizenship in any other States without their consent? Does the Constitution of the United States set upon him, and clothe him with all the rights of a citizen? The Court think the affirmative cannot be sustained; and, if not, the plaintiff could not be a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution, nor a citizen of the United States, and, consequently, not entitled to sue in its Courts.

It is true that every person, and every class and description of persons at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, regarded as citizens of the several States, became citizens of this new political body, and none other. It was formed for them and their posterity, and for nobody else; and all the rights and immunities were intended to embrace only those of State communities, or those who became members according to the principles on which the Constitution was adopted. It was a Union of those who were members of the political communities, whose power, for certain specified purposes, extended over the whole territories of the United States, and gave each citizen rights outside his State which he did not before possess, and placed all rights of persons and property on an equality.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine, who were citizens of the several States when the Constitution was adopted. In order to do this we must recur to the Colonies when they separated from Great Britain, formed new communities, and took their place among the family of nations. They who were recognized as citizens of the States declared their independence of Great Britain, and defended it by force of arms. Another class persons, who had been imported as slaves, or their descendents, were not recognized or intended to be included in that memorable instrument—the Declaration of Independence. It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion, respecting that unfortunate class, with the civilized and enlightened portion of the world, at the time of the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the Constitution; but history shows they have for more than a century been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and unfit associates for the white race, either socially or politically; and had no rights which white men were bound to respect; and the black man might be reduced to Slavery, bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise. This opinion, at that time, was fixed and universal with the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals which no one thought of disputing, and every one habitually acted upon it without doubting for a moment the correctness of the opinion. And in no nation was this opinion more fixed and generally acted upon than in England the subjects of which Government not only seized them off the Coast of Africa, but took them as ordinary merchandise, to where they could make a profit on them. The opinion thus entertained, was universally impressed on the Colonists this side of the Atlantic; accordingly, negroes of the African race were regarded by them as property, and held, and brought, and sold, as such , in every one of the thirteen Colonies which united in the Declaration of Independence, and afterward formed the Constitution. The doctrine of which we have spoken was strikingly enforced by the Declaration of Independence. It begins thus:

"When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature’s God entitles them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation;" and then proceeds;

"We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created equal; that they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." &c.

The words before quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too close for dispute that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, for in that case, the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence, would be flagrantly acting against the principles which they asserted. They who framed the Declaration of Independence were men too much honor, education and intelligence, to say what they did not believe; and they knew that in no part of the civilized world where the negro race, by common consent, admitted to the rights of freemen. They spoke and acted according to the practices, doctrines, and usages of the day. That unfortunate race was supposed to be separate from the whites, and was never thought or spoken of except as property. These opinions underwent no change when the Constitution was adopted. The Preamble sets forth for what purpose, and for whose benefit it was formed. It was formed by the people—such as had been members of the original States—and the great object was to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." It speaks in general terms of citizens and people of the United States when providing for the powers granted, without defining what description of persons should be included, or who should be regarded as citizens. But two clauses of the Constitution point to the negro race as separate, and not regarded as citizens, for whom the Constitution was adopted: one clause reserves the right to import slaves until 1808, and in the second the States pledge themselves, one to another, to preserve the rights of the master, and to deliver up slaves escaping to their respective Territories. By the first clause the right to purchase and hold this property is directly sanctioned and authorized by the persons who framed the Constitution, for twenty years; and the States pledged themselves to uphold the right of the master as long as the Government then formed should endure. And this shows conclusively that another description of persons were embraced in the other provisions of the Constitution. These two clauses were not intended to confer upon them or their posterity the blessings of Liberty so carefully conferred upon the whites. None of this class ever emigrated to the United States voluntarily. They were all articles of merchandise. The number emancipated was few as compared with those who were held in Slavery, and none sufficiently numerous to attract public attention as a separate class, and were regarded as a part of the slave population rather than free.

It cannot be supposed that the States conferred citizenship upon them, for all those States at that time established police regulations for the security of themselves and families, as well as of property. In some minor cases, there were different modes of trial, and it could not be supposed that those States would have formed or consented to a Government which abolished this right, and took from them the safeguards essential to their own protection. They have not the right to bear arms, and appear at public meetings to discuss political questions, or urge measures of reform which they might deem advisable. They cannot vote at elections, nor serve as jurors, nor appear as witnesses where whites are concerned. These rights are secured in every State to white men. It is impossible to believe that the men of the slaveholding States, who took so large a share in the formation of the Constitution, could be so regardless of themselves and the safety of those who trusted and confided in them.

Every law of naturalization confines citizenship to white persons. This is a marked separation from the blacks. Under the Confederation, every State had a right to decide for itself, and the term "free inhabitant," the generality of form, certainly excluded the African race. Laws were framed for the latter, especially. Under the Constitution the word "citizen" is substituted for "free inhabitant." After further elaboration on this point, the Chief Justice said, from the last consideration, we have come to the conclusion that the African race who came to this country, whether free or slave, were not intended to be included in the Constitution for the enjoyment of any personal rights or benefits; and the two provisions which point to them treat them as property, and make it the duty of the Government to protect them as such. Hence, the Court is of opinion, from the facts stated in the plea in abatement, that Dred Scott is not a citizen of Missouri, and is not, therefore, entitled to sue in the United States Courts.

The following facts appear on the record: "In the year 1834 the plaintiff was a negro slave belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in the army of the United States. In that year (1834) said Dr. Emerson took the plaintiff from the State of Missouri to the military post at Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, and held him there as a slave until the month of April, 1836. At the time last mentioned, said Mr. Emerson removed the plaintiff from said military post at Rock Island to the military post at Fort Snelling, situated on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in the territory known as Upper Louisiana, acquired by the United States from France, and situated north of the latitude of 36 degrees 30’ north, and north of the State of Missouri. Said Dr. Emerson held the plaintiff in slavery at said Fort Snelling until the year 1838.

In the year 1835, Harriet, (who is named in the second count of the plaintiff’s declaration) was the slave of Major Taliaferro, who belonged to the army of the United States. In that year, (1835,) said Major Taliaferro took said Harriet to said Fort Snelling, a military post situated as herein before stated, and kept her there as a slave until the year 1836, and then sold and delivered her as a slave at Fort Snelling unto said Dr. Emerson, herein before named; and said Dr Emerson held said Harriet in Slavery at said Fort Snelling until the year 1838.

In the year 1836, the plaintiff and said Harriet, at said Fort Snelling, with the consent of said Dr. Emerson, who then claimed to be their master and owner, intermarried and took each other for husband and wife. Eliza and Lizzie, named in the third count of the plaintiff’s declaration are the fruit of that marriage. Eliza is about fourteen years old, and was born on board the steamboat Gipsey, north of the north line of the State of Missouri, and upon the Mississippi River; Lizzie is about seven years old, and was born in the State of Missouri, at the military post called Jefferson Barracks.

In the year 1838, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff and said Harriet and their said daughter Eliza, form said Fort Snelling to the State of Missouri, where they have ever since resided. Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff, said Harriet, Eliza and Lizzie, to the defendant as slaves, and the defendant claimed to hold each of them as slaves. "At the times mentioned in the plaintiff’s declaration, the defendant, claiming to be owner as afore said, laid his hand upon said plaintiff, Harriot, Eliza and Lizzie, and imprisoned them; doing in this respect, however, no more than what he might lawfully do if they were of right his slaves at each times."

The Chief Justice proceeded to examine the statement, assuming that this part of the controversy presented two questions.

Firstly--Was he (Scott) and all his family free in Missouri; and

Secondly--If not, were they free by reason of their removal to Rock Island, Illinois.

The act of Congress on which the plaintiff relies contains the clause, that Slavery and involuntary servitude, except for crime, shall be forever prohibited in that part of the Territory acquired by treaty from Louisiana, and not included within the limits of the State of Louisiana. The difficulty which meets us at the threshold is, whether Congress is authorized to pass such a law under the powers granted to it by the Constitution? The plaintiff dwells much on the clause which gives Congress power "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory or other property of the United States!" But this provision has no bearing on the present controversy. The power there given is confined to the Territory which then belonged to the United States, and can have no influence on Territory which was acquired from foreign Governments. The Justice then referred to the cessions of land by Virginia and other States, saying the only object was to put an end to existing controversies, and to enable Congress to dispose of the lands for the common benefit. Undoubtedly the power of sovereignty and eminent domain was ceded in the act. This was proper to make it essential. There was then no Government in existence with enumerated powers. What was called the States, were thirteen independent colonies which entered into confederation for mutual protection. It was little more than a Congress of Ambassadors in which all had a common concern. It was this Congress which accepted the cession from Virginia. They had no right to do so under the articles of the Confederation, but they had a right as independent powers to accept the land for the common benefit: and it is equally clear, having no superior to control them, they had a right to exercise absolute dominion, subject only to the restrictions which Virginia imposed. The ordinance of 1787 was adopted, by which the territory should be governed, and among other provisions was one that slavery or involuntary servitude should be prohibited except for crime.

This was the state of things when the Constitution was formed. The Territory ceded by Virginia belonged to the several confederate States as common property. The States were about to dissolve the Confederation and surrender a portion of their power for the formation of a new Government, and the language used limited and specified the objects to be accomplished. It was obvious that some provision was now necessary to give the new Government the power to carry into affect every object for which the Territory was ceded. It was necessary that the lands should be sold to pay the was debt, and that power should be given to protect the citizens who might emigrate with their rights of property, arms, military stores, (as well as ships of war,) with the "common property of the States existing in their independent character, and they had a right to take their property to the Territory, without the authority of the States." The object was to place these things under the guardianship of a new government, which gives Congress the power "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory or other property of the United States." It applied only to property held in common at the time, and not with reference to any property which the sovereignty might subsequently acquire. It applied to the territory then in existence, and known as the territory of the United States--then in the mind of the framers of the Constitution, it refers to the sale or raising of money. This is different from the power to legislate over the territories. With the words "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory," are coupled the words, "and other property of the United States." And the concluding words render this construction irresistible: "and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State."

It is obvious that the Congress, under the new Government, regarded the above clause as necessary to carry into effect the principles and provisions of the Ordinance of 1787, which they regarded as an act of the States in the exercise of their political power at the time: and these representatives of the same States under the new Government, did not think proper to depart from essential principle, and did not attempt to undo anything that was done.

As to territory acquired without the limits of the United States, it remains territory until admitted into the Union. No power is given in the Constitution to acquire territory to be held and governed in that character; and, consequently, there cannot be found in the Constitution any definition of power which Congress may lawfully exercise before it becomes a State. The power to acquire territory until it is in a condition be become a State on an equal footing with the other States must necessarily rest on sound discretion, and it becomes the duty of the Government to administer the laws of the United States for the protection of personal rights and property therein.

Whatever territory is acquired is for the common benefit of the people of the United States, which is but a Trustee. At the time that territory was obtained from France, it contained no population to be admitted as a State, and it therefore became necessary to hold possession of it until settled and inhabited by a civilized community, capable of self government and for admission into the Union. But as we before said, it was acquired by the Federal Government as the representative and trustee of the people of the United States, and must be held for their common and equal benefit; for it was the acquisition of the people of the United States, acting through their agents, and Government held it for the common benefit until it should become associated as a member of the Union. Until that time arrived it was undoubtedly necessary that some government be established to protect the inhabitants in their persons and property. The power to acquire carries with it the power to preserve. The form of government necessarily rests on the discretion of Congress. It is their duty to establish the best suited for the United States, and that must depend on the number of its inhabitants, and the character and situation of the territory. What government is the best must depend on the condition of the territory at the time, to be continued until it shall become a State. But there can never be a mere discretionary power over persons and property. These are plainly defined by the Constitution. The Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceable to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievance," &c. Thus the rights of property are united with the personal rights, and this extends to the territories as well as to the States. Congress cannot authorize the territories do what it cannot do itself; it cannot confer on the territories power to violate the provisions of the Constitution.

It seems, however, that there is supposed to be a difference between slaves and other property. The people in the formation of the Constitution, delegated to the General Government certain enumerated powers and forbade the exercise of others. It has no powers over persons and property of citizens except those enumerated in the Constitution. If the Constitution recognizes the right of master and slave, and makes no difference between slaves and other property, no tribunal acting under the authority of the United States can draw such a distinction and deny the provisions and guarantees secured against the encroachment of the Government. As we have already said the right of property in a slave is expressly conferred in the Constitution, and guaranteed to every State. This is in language too plain to be misunderstood; and no words can be found in the Constitution giving Congress greater power over slaves than over any other description of property.

It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that the act of Congress which prohibits citizens from holding property of this character north of a certain line is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and neither Dred Scott nor any one of this family were made free by their residence in Illinois. The plaintiff was not a citizen of Missouri, but was still a slave, and therefore had no right to sue in a Court of the United States.

The Court having thus examined the case as it stands under the Constitution, proceeded to other points saying, as Scott was a slave when he was brought back to Missouri from Illinois, he was under the law of the former and not of the latter. It has been settled by the highest tribunals that an individual does not acquire his freedom under such circumstances. As it appears to the Court that the plaintiff is not a citizen of Missouri, nor a citizen of the United States who could sue in the United States Courts, this Court can give no judgment, and hence the suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Associate Justice Nelson stated the grounds on which he had arrived at the conclusion that the argument of the Court below must be affirmed. Having stated the case, substantially, as above, he proceeded to examine it on its merits. The question was, whether the removal of the plaintiff, with his master, to Illinois, with a view to a temporary residence, and after his return to Missouri, was such a residence in a Free State as worked emancipation. He maintained that it did not. Such questions belonged to the States to decide for themselves. As to whether Missouri will recognize or give effect to the laws of Illinois on the subject of Slavery, is for Missouri herself to determine, nor is there any constitutional power rightfully to control her. Every State or nation possesses exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within her own territory, and her laws affect and bind all property within her limits. No State or nation can affect or bind persons or property outside of her territory. The question is fully established that it belongs to the sovereign States of Missouri to determine the question of slavery within her own jurisdiction, subject only to such limitations as may be found in the Constitution. This is the result of the independent and sovereign character of the State. It is equally applicable to the other States belonging to the Confederacy. It must be admitted that Congress possesses no power to create or abolish slavery in a state, and if Congress possess power under the Constitution to abolish slavery in the territories, it must necessarily possess the power to establish it. This he denied, and then proceeded to show that the question involved in the case now before the Court was one depending solely on the law of Missouri, concluding with the remark that the judgment of the Court below should be affirmed.

Associate Justice Catron also stated the history of the case, and said that if the Court has no power to decide the question further then to dismiss it, it had no right to discuss its merits: but he said that the Court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case, which he proceeded to examine. It was now too late to question the power to govern the Territories as incipient States, and fit them for admission. The only question was, how far the power of Congress is limited as to the Northwest Territory. Virginia had the right to abolish Slavery there, and did so, by an agreement, in 1787, with the other States; but this did not prevent new States being admitted with or without Slavery. Subsequently, North Carolina and Georgia ceded their lands for the common benefit, and Congress has no more power to legislate Slavery out of those cessions than it had to legislate Slavery in the Territory North of the Ohio. There was no power to legislate on Slavery in either case. The inhabitants stood protected after as they did before the cessions were made. In Louisiana Slavery was not only lawful, but was most valuable. At the date of the treaty the inhabitants were left free to enjoy their property, freedom and liberty, and were to be protected therein until they came into the Union as a State. The Missouri line of 36 30 was an act of aggression. Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot perform directly. If a Southern man cannot go to the Territories with his slaves, it follows that a Northern farmer or mechanic cannot bring with him his implements of toll. If Congress could prohibit any species of lawful property throughout Louisiana when it was acquired, so it could exclude all descriptions of property. The right to legislate in the Territories depends on the contract of cession. His opinion was that the third article of the treaty by which Louisiana was acquired stands protected by the Constitution, and cannot be repealed by Congress, and that the act of 1820, known as the Missouri Compromise, violates the leading features of the Constitution, on which the Union depends, and which secures to all citizens common rights. He therefore held that the act was void, and concurred with his brother Judges that the plaintiff, Dred Scott, is a slave, and was one when this suit was brought.

The Dred Scott Case

We publish this morning the opinion delivered by Chief Justice Taney on the Dred Scott case, on the 6th of March. The law of Illinois, as laid down by the Supreme Court of this State is, that if a slave be brought into this State by his master he becomes a free man.

In 1834 Dred Scott, being a slave in Missouri, was taken by his owner, an officer in the United States Army, to Rock Island, in Illinois, whence, in 1836, he was removed to Fort Snelling, in Minnesota. He there found Harriet, whom he presently married, and who, having been a slave in Missouri, had been brought the year before to Fort Snelling by her master also an officer in the army.

He and his wife and children were afterwards carried back to Missouri, and there reduced to slavery; thereupon Scott brought suit in the U. S. District Court to obtain his freedom. The case was carried to Washington, before the full bench. It was met at the threshold of the Court by a decision of the Chief Justice and his four Slave-holding associates, that a negro cannot sue in the United States Courts; that he is not a citizen of the United States. Of course this should have been the end of the case. The Court had no occasion, had no right to go a step further. But as a part of the grand conspiracy against Freedom, they proceeded to pronounce on extra judicial opinion, covering other points, and involving more important questions than it has ever before passed upon. We will not stop here to review the opinion of Judge Taney, but will leave that for Judges McLean and Curtis,—the reply of the former will be given tomorrow.

Alton Courier, Friday, March 20, 1857

Dred Scott

Some inquiry having been made of us as to the grounds of the suit brought by Dred Scott for the freedom of himself and family the recent decision upon which, by the U.S. supreme Court, has caused such an Intense excitement--we will simply say that Scott predicates his claim to freedom upon a law of Illinois, which provides that if a slave be brought to this State by his master, or comes with the consent of his master, except for the single purpose of passing through it, he becomes a free man.

The facts in his case are these: In 1834 Dred Scott, being a slave in Missouri, was taken by his owner, an officer in the United States army, to Rock Island, in Illinois, whence, in 1836, he was removed to Fort Snelling, in Minnesota. He there found Harriet, to whom he was soon married, and who, having been a slave in Missouri, had been brought the year before to Fort Snelling by her master, also an officer in the army.

He and his wife and children were afterwards carried back to Missouri, and there reduced to slavery; thereupon Scott brought suit in the United States District Court to obtain his freedom. Being decided against him,the case was carried to Washington, before the full bench, on a writ of error. It was met at the threshold of the supreme court by a decision of the Chief Justice and his four sIaveholding associates, that a negro cannot sue in the United States Courts; that he is not a citizen of the United, States. Of course this should have been the end of the case. The Court had no occasion, had no right to go a step further. But as a part of the grand conspiracy against freedom, they proceeded to pronounce an extra judicial opinion, covering other points, and involving more important questions than it has ever before passed upon.

By virtue of his two years residence in Illinois, Scott claims his freedom; and, un-der the Ordinance of '89, both he and his wife are entitled to their freedom. Their owners, having taken them into a Territory where the law expressly said slavery could not exist, voluntarily surrendered all future claim to their persons or services.

We have always heretofore cherished the highest possible respect for the Supreme Court of the U. S., as all Americans should; but the truckling, time-serving nature of the majority decision in this case, must low-er those who subscribe it in the estimation of all honorable men and pure patriots.

According to the general understanding of Iawyers, the opinions of the majority of the court have no authority beyond the bare de-cision that a colored man is not a citizen of the United States; the doctrine they have attempted to sustain shows the lengths to which they are prepared to proceed. In any case involving the question whether Con-gress has power to prohibit slavery in the territories, they are prepared to decide in the negative. In any suit where the power of the master over his slave beyond the ju-risdiction of the slave states is denied, they are prepared to sustain and enforce it. We now know that, in any future controversy before their tribunal, in which the question of the nationality of slavery may come up, they will go as far as they have gone in the extra-judicial opinions pronounced by them in the case of dred scott. They may even,

for aught we know, carry the doctrine of the supremacy of slavery much further. It is a growing doctrine, enlarging itself by new accretions from year to year.

Slavery National -- Freedom Sectional.

Washington, March 6.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case was delivered to-day by Chief Justice Taney. It was a full and elaborate statement of the views of the Court, and they have decided that the following are all the important points:

First -- That negroes, either slave or free, as men of the race, are not citizens of the United States, by the Constitution;

Second -- That the ordinance of 1787 had no independent constitutional force or legal affect subsequently to the adoption of the Constitution, and could not operate of itself to confer the freedom or citizenship within the Northwest Territory of negroes, not citizens by the Constitution.

Third -- That the provisions of the act of 1820, commonly called the Missouri Compromise, so far as it undertook to exclude negro slavery from, and confer freedom and citizenship to the negro in the northern part of the Louisiana cession, was a legislative act exceeding the powers of Congress, void, and of no legal effect to that end.

In deciding the main points, the Supreme Court have determined upon the following incidental points:

First -- The expression territory and other property of the Union in the Constitution, applies in terms only to such territory as the Union possessed at the time of adopting the Constitution.

Second -- The rights of citizens of the United States emigrating to any federal territory under the power of the Federal Government there, depend upon the general provisions of the Constitution, which defines in this, as well as in all other respects, the powers of Congress. As Congress does not possess the power itself to make enactments relative to the personal property of citizens of the United States in federal territory, other than such as the Constitution confers, so it cannot constitutionally delegate any such power to a Territorial Government organized by it under the Constitution.

Third -- The legal condition of a slave in the State of Missouri is not affected by the temporary sojourn of such slave in any other State, but on his return, his condition still depends upon the laws of Missouri, and as the plaintiff was not a citizen of Missouri, therefore he could not sue in the courts of the United States, and the suit must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The delivery of this opinion occupied about three hours. It was listened to with profound attention by a crowded court room. Among the auditors were many gentlemen of eminent legal ability and a due proportion of ladies.

Justice Wilson stated as to the merits of the case, the question being, whether or not the removal of Scott from Missouri with his master to Illinois with a view to a temporary residence worked his emancipation, he maintained that the question depends solely upon the law of Missouri, and for that reason the judgment of the Court below should be confirmed.

Justice Catron believed that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case. He argued that Congress could not do directly what it could not do indirectly. If it could exclude one species of property it could another. With regard to Territories ceded, Congress could govern them only under the restrictions of the States which ceded them, and the Missouri act of 1820, violating the leading features of the Constitution -- it was, therefore, void. He concurred with his brother Judges that Scott is a slave, and was so when the suit was brought.

Several other Judges are to deliver their views tomorrow.

As was to be expected from this degenerated tribunal. We await the opinions of the dissenting Judges, especially John McLeans' with the hope that Freedom and the Constitution will be vindicated in the argument.

THE DRED SCOTT CASE.

In the judgment of the Court, Slavery is national, and the time honored immunities of personal liberty are done away. Everything is conceded to that supreme power which has not only the executive and the legislative, but even the judicial department of the Government under its feet. The decision of the Court, as pronounced by Chief Justice Taney decides three things: 1^st. That a negro is not a United States citizen within the meaning of the Constitution. 2d. That the Missouri Compromise line was unconstitutional. And 3d. That the Ordinance of 1787 was superseded by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, and is therefore void. Another opinion, delivered in behalf of the Court by Justice Catron, virtually settles the Lemmon case by sanctioning the right of a master to carry his slaves through a Free State, and declaring that a slave taken there by consent of such master, on his return retains his servile condition. Such immense concessions as these, on the part of the federal judiciary, are quite glory enough for one day to the advocates of Slavery extension.

The following paragraphs from the Washington correspondence of the New York Times, upon the recent decision of the majority of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case, are pertinent at this time. Written as they were by a person who must necessarily hear some of the opinions of the leading political men of the country, they are possessed of considerable interest:

Although the decision of the Supreme Court in the Missouri case made a momentary sensation, and may be the means of renewing the agitation in Congress through attempted legislation, to give it practical vatality, still, among jurists, it is not considered to settle anything more than the denied of jurisdiction in the case of Dred Scott. The incidental questions, which the majority undertook to consider and to pronounce upon, could not be decided after the first proposition, denying the jurisdiction, was determined. They were, as the lawyers say, coram non judice, and the whole discussion was extra judical. But it exhibited the eagerness of the majority of that tribunal, to force an opinion upon the country, and to thrust itself into the political contests. The five Southern Judges, Taney, Catron, Wayne, Daniels and Campbell, pronounced the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, and at the last hour, Judge Grier concurred throughout. Judge Nelson let the constitutional question take care of itself. But Judges McLean and Curtis, in opinions that will stand among the proudest monuments of the Court, met every point, which had been presented, and by the most positive demonstration, completely annihilated the positions of the majority. Mr. Badger, of North Carolina, whose distinction as a lawyer entitles his judgment to more than ordinary value, said at the conclusion of Judge Curtis opinion, that it was the most clear, compact and conclusive piece of judicial reasoning, from first to last, that he had ever heard or read. And this seemed to be the impression of a large and discriminating audience.

No decision of the Supreme Court has ever absolutely determined a great political question. The subject matter in controversy is all that a decree can reach. When that tribunal, with Chief Justice Marshall at its head, declared a bank of the United States to be constitutional, the Democratic party, under the inspirations from the White House, warred against it unceasely, and finally succeeded in its overthrow, upon the ground that it was unconstitutional. Only a few years ago the court declared the Wheeling bridge an obstruction to the navigation of the Ohio, and ordered it to be removed or confirmed to the decree, which involved nearly the same result. Congress interfered and established a past route over it, by which the judgment of the court was practically reversed. We all look with respect and some degree of reverence upon this tribunal of last resort, but the circumstances attending the present decision have done much to divest it of moral influence, and to impair the confidence of the country.

The Dred Scott Case

Belleville St. Clair Tribune, March 20, 1857

We have taken no part in pre-judicial conjectures as to the determination of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the noted case of the negro Dred Scott. We have taken no notice of the different rumors afloat as to the particular points which would be embraced in the decision; preferring to await the published report coming direct from the Supreme Bench.

In the year 1834, Dred Scott was a slave belonging to Dr. Emerson, a surgeon in the army. In that year Dr. E. took the negro from Missouri to Rock Island in this State, and from there to Fort Snelling, a military post in the Territory known as Upper Louisiana, where Dred Scott was held in slavery till 1838. In 1836 Dr. Emerson bought a negress named Harriet, and this woman in the same year intermarried with Dred Scott. Eliza and Lizzie were the fruit of that marriage. The first was born North of the line known as the Missouri Restriction and the second was born in Missouri. In 1838 Dr. Emerson removed Scott together with Harriet and Eliza, to Missouri, where they have since resided.

It was claimed that Scott was free the moment he crossed the line of 36 degrees and 30 minutes, under the act of Congress of 1820 which prohibited slavery North of that line, and upon this (mainly) the Supreme Court have just decided.

The first point in the decision, as delivered by Chief Justice Taney, is that negroes are not citizens and have no right to sue in the courts. No one can be a citizen of the United States except under the Constitution, but it does not follow because a man is recognized as a citizen in New York or Massachusetts that he is a citizen in Illinois. The constitution authorizes congress to establish a uniform rule of naturalization; therefore, no State by naturalizing an alien can give him the rights of all the States under the General Government.

The Supreme Court decides that those who had been imported as slaves, or their descendants; were not intended to be included in the Declaration of Independence. The men who framed that instrument spoke and acted according to the practices, usage, and doctrines of that time. The negroes were supposed to be a separate race from the whites and were never thought of except as property or merchandise. Every law of naturalization confines citizenship to white persons. The Chief Justice said after the best consideration the Court concluded that the African race, free or slave, were not intended to be included in the Constitution for the enjoyment of any personal rights or benefits. Hence Scott was not a citizen of Missouri and not entitled to sue in the United States Courts.

On the constitutionality of the Missouri Restriction, commonly known as the Compromise line, the decision of the Supreme Court is not less plain and pointed. The territory ceded by Virginia belonged to several States as common property. It was necessary at the time the Constitution was formed that the lands should be sold to pay the war debt, and that power should be given to protect the citizens who might emigrate, with rights of property, arms, &c. The object was to place these things under the guardianship of a new government which gives Congress the "power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the U.S." This applied only to property held in common at the time. It applied to territory then in existence – then in the minds of the framers of the Constitution. It refers to the sale or raising of money. This is quite different from the power to legislate over the territories. The Chief Justice goes on to say:

"As to territory acquired without the limits of the United States, it remains territory until admitted into the Union. No power is given in the Constitution to acquire territory to be held and governed in that character; and, consequently, there cannot be found in the Constitution any definition of power which Congress may lawfully exercise before it becomes a State. The power to acquire territory until it is in a condition to become a State on an equal footing with the other States must necessarily rest on sound discretion, and it becomes the duty of the Government to administer the laws of the United Stated for the protection of personal rights and property therein.

The power to acquire carries with it the power to preserve. The form of government necessarily rests on the discretion of Congress. It is their duty to establish the best suited for the United States and that must depend on the number of its inhabitants, and the character and situation of the Territory. What Government is the best must depend on the condition of the Territory at the time to be continued until it shall become a State. But there never can be a more discretionary power over persons and property. These are plainly defined by the Constitution. The Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," &c. Thus the rights of property are united with the personal rights, and this extends to the Territories as well to the States. Congress cannot authorize the Territories to do what it cannot do itself; it cannot confer on the Territories power to violate the provisions of the Constitution.

It seems, however, that there is supposed to be a difference between slaves and other property. The People, in the formation of the Constitution, delegated to the General Government, certain enumerated powers, and forbade the exercise of others. It has no powers over persons and property of citizens except those enumerated in the Constitution. If the Constitution recognizes the right of mater and slave, and makes no difference between slaves and other property, no tribunal acting under the authority of the United States, can draw such a distinction, and deny the provisions and guarantees secured against the encroachment of the Government. As we have already said, the right of property in a slave is expressly conferred in the Constitution and guaranteed to every State. This is in language to plain to be misunderstood; and no where to be found in the Constitution giving Congress greater power over slaves, than any other description of property."

The conclusion is as follows:

"It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that the act of Congress which prohibits citizens from holding property of this character North of a certain line is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and neither Dred Scott nor any one of his family were made free by their residence in Illinois. The plaintiff was not a citizen of Missouri, but was still a slave, and therefor had no right to sue in a court of the United States."

We have no inclination just now to comment on this decision. The main points we have enlarged upon so often since the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill that we may well conclude our readers are heartily tired of "niggers" and "36 30," and "slavery," and "Missouri Compromise," and so forth. The question is settled forever. The highest legal tribunal in the country has decided it and it will not be apt to reverse its own judgement.