"I once belonged to a party, now obsolete, called the Democratic Party," Nicholas Biddle, President of the Second Bank of the United States once wrote, " a very good party until it was spoiled by Gen. Jackson." This was written somewhere around 1836 during the later years of the Bank War. The Bank War was a period of time, 1829-1836, in which the seventh President of the United States, Andrew Jackson, and the Second Bank of the United States (BUS) were in a deep political battle concerning the fate of the American economic system. The Bank War can be broken down into three stages. The first stage 1829-32 was when the two sides first clashed and then reached a compromise. Followed by the second stage when the Bank requested for re-charter and General Jackson vetoed the action in 1832. The last stage, 1832-1836, was during the last years of the Bank when Jackson was not beaten in the 1832 election by National-Republican, Henry Clay, a friend to the Bank, and Jackson's removal of government deposits. The first stage of the War will be discussed in the following pages.

The Bank War was not a battle of rich against poor as many were led to believe. Jackson himself was a rich lawyer and landowner. He did however embody the new American idea of the self-made man. In the Jacksonian mindset there were only two social classes: the common man, in which Jackson thought of himself, and the rich aristocrat. Within the common man there was a new ideology that anyone, through their own sweat and blood, could become rich. These were the self-made men of the western states. The self-made man came to think of themselves as morally superior to the old born into wealthy colonial states. These frontier men envied the social and economic advantages that the urban merchant capitalists enjoyed. The western rich felt the East

benefited from their work. This was true for Jackson as well. When he was elected to the White House in 1828 he brought all the western zeal with him. When the Jacksonians began their attack on the Bank they still used the language of their rural backgrounds. Words like "oppression", "moneyed power", "monopoly" soon were used to describe the Bank, while words of praise-like "the humble", "the honest and industrious" were used to describe the common man. The destruction of the Bank was a blow to the older privileged rich by a new more aggressive businessman.

Jackson's political motive was central to the Bank War but this was not the sole reasoning behind his historic veto to end the Second Bank of the United States. Jackson expressed his dislike of the Bank in a journal entry dated January 4, 1830. In five points he explained his dislike for the Bank. He regarded the Bank as dangerous to the liberties of the American people because it represented an enormous centralization of power into the hands of a few. Although the Bank maintained political neutrality it was impossible for Jackson to believe that such an establishment with so much money and privileges could remain independent of the political process. If the Bank became involved it could, under a dishonest president, "unite all its power and influence in his support" which could "threaten to destroy our Republican institutions." He questioned the constitutionality of the Bank's charter noting that the Constitution forbade Congress to create banks and own corporations and, thereby have stockholders. Jackson wrote in 1820," You know my opinion as to the banks.... the Constitution of the United States prohibited the establishment of banks in any state. Sir, the tenth section of the first article of the federal Constitution is positive and explicit..." Since some of this stock was owned by foreigner he feared that they could somehow influence the Bank. Were these objections a viable reason to destroy an institution that had proved to be a necessary instrument for the daily function of the newly industrialized nation? Jackson's political opinions were central to the Bank War, but were unjustified and out of date when he presented his veto to Congress. The Second Bank of the United States, by the 1830s, had proven to be a necessary institution able to handle regulatory functions essential in providing the monetary needs of the new growing economy. The veto was executed more to settle personal grievances toward the institution then the welfare of the union.

The Second Bank of the United States was brought into being after the disastrous period when the First Bank of the United States' charter had expired in 1811 and the dreadful condition the economy was in after the War of 1812. President Madison, in his message to the opening of the fourteenth Congress in 1815, urged the body of the necessity of creating a uniform currency either through a national bank or by Government issues. Although Madison was against the First Bank because of constitutionality questions he stated, "for interest in the community at large, as well as the purposes of the treasury, it is essential that the nation should possess a currency of equal value, credit, and use, wherever it may circulate. The constitution has entrusted Congress, exclusively, with the power of creating and regulating a currency of that description." The bitter experiences of the years following 1811 led many former opponents of the First Bank to support the measure. The bill to charter a Second Bank of the United States passed both houses of Congress and was approved by President Madison on April 10, 1816. The Bank's permanent home would be on Chestnut Street in Philadelphia.

The structural outline was basically the same as the first Bank's, but was conceived on a much larger scale. The capital was set at thirty -five million dollars and a board of twenty-five directors would operate the BUS, five of whom would be appointed by the President of the United States and the stockholders would elect the other twenty. The directors would then choose a president who would administer the Bank's day-to-day operations which included the governing boards of its branch banks. The Bank had the authority to issue bank notes redeemable for specie or coin of the realm. The Bank would become the custodian of the public funds, and its notes would be acceptable for all payments due to the United States either from taxes or tariffs. In return the bank would handle the government's financial affairs, free of charge, such as transferring funds from one location to another and would provide the money needed to pay the national debt. The government's deposits bore no interest because of the role the Bank played in conducting and managing the funds. These funds, however, could be invested for the profit of the Stockholders.

When the Second Bank was chartered, there were approximately sixty-eight million dollars of state bank notes in circulation. The prime purpose of the Bank was now to stabilize the weakened economy by resolving the specie problem and restoring the currency to a sound basis. By February 20, 1817 it did this when state banks finally resumed specie payments. This was not an arbitrary date. Congress had passed a resolution six weeks earlier requiring that after February 20 all payments to the United States had to be either in specie, Treasury notes, in the federal Bank notes, or in state bank notes that would be redeemable for specie on demand. Congresses believed that, contrary to the belief, these state banks had accumulated sufficient specie and could redeem their notes if they only would. Local banks protested that this date would strain their resources too thinly if the BUS forced them to have the notes redeemed. In a last minute effort the BUS agreed on not to redeem the notes until these banks had enough specie on hand to cover their worth and still keep a supply in local banks' vaults.

The first president of the BUS, a political choice of Madison, was former Secretary of the Navy, William Jones. Having just gone through bankruptcy, Jones soon proved why. His actions nearly ruined the Banks' first year of operation by speculating on its stock and making too many loans in paper currency. His policies were to blame for the Panic of 1819. The causes of the Panic were due to the inflammatory credit policies that led to a land speculation boom. State banks borrowed heavily from the BUS and invested in real state and land improvement projects. The national government encouraged large-scale speculation in both the northwest and southwest to land speculators who then bought the land on easy credit. By 1818 the Bank had over $22 million in outstanding loans and only $2.3 million of specie on hand. Finally realizing the danger of note expansion in August 1818, each branch was prohibited from redeeming any BUS branch notes except its own. Each branch also issued their own notes as well as national notes.

At this point Jones retired in disgrace and was replaced by Langdon Cheves. Cheves' policies soon stabilized the Bank. But by doing so, he continued the Bank's contractionist policies, which were brutal to the country. Western branches were refused the right to issue any notes and their circulation dropped to almost nothing in this section. The value of banknotes in circulation in 1816 was $68 million; by January 1820 this was reduced to a little under $45 million. Secretary of the Treasury, William H. Crawford wrote, "All the evils which the community in particular parts of the county has suffered from the sudden decrease of the currency, as well as from its direction have been ascribed to the Bank of the United States." To bring the Bank back to financial soundness loans were called in and mortgages were foreclosed. The over extension of credit caused the bank to foreclose on loans owed by farmers who had no security except the mortgages on their land. Many of their loans were spent on improvements that could not be repaid on demand. State banks' notes were collected and presented for payment in specie. Since these banks had over speculated through the encouragement of the BUS they couldn't meet the demand now placed on them and slid into bankruptcy. This led to the rapid drop in prices, including real estate, ruining many investors at the same time.

States in their distress turned on the Bank. Several states began to pass heavy tax laws on any bank chartered outside of the state. Maryland, for example, imposed a similar tax on the BUS Baltimore branch. The branch refused to pay and the Bank sued the state. The Bank lost its case in the state courts, but appealed to the United State Supreme Court. In the decision of McCullach v. Maryland the court sided with the bank and in Chief Justice John Marshall's decision he denied the states had the right to tax an agency of the federal government therefore the state taxes were null and void. He also said that the BUS "is a convenient, a useful and essential instrument in the prosecution of the Government's fiscal operation therefore not a matter of controversy." By the Court's ruling not only did it deny the states to tax the bank but it also gave Congress the power to charter the Bank as a federal agency.

The Panic of 1819 came to an end in 1821. Three million people, or one-third of the population, were in some way effected by the depression in caused. It is safe to say that many state banks and businesses blamed the Bank for their failures and the Bank didn't make friends in the western states. Thus the Bank earned widespread hatred throughout the nation. Some of the animosity subsided when Cheves retired and Nicholas Biddle replaced him. Cheves left resenting the choice not because he disliked Biddle, who had been on the Bank's Board of directors since 1819, but how eagerly the board was to replace him.

On January 23 1823 Nicholas Biddle at age 34 became president of the largest private enterprise in the United States and had much different ideas as to the circulation of the Bank’s money. He wanted to bring back the stability of the economy especially to the South and West. The branches of the BUS in the West and South were once again allowed to issue their notes up to a specific amount. To offset the drain of specie that would flow to the East as in the previous years, Biddle encouraged the southern and western branches to make loans on bills of exchange payable in the East. When these bills were paid in the East, the specie then provided the funds in which the bank notes could be paid. He encouraged short-term loans to state banks that would encourage improvements such as canals and roads.

Biddle became the best thing that had ever happen to the Bank. After he became president, Biddle used his enormous powers with restraint. With his maturing banking practices he promoted the Bank's interest and at the same time kept the interests of state banks, their creditors, the Treasury and the nations interests in mind. He tried "neither to destroy his competitors or enrich his own stockholders" as one of the severest Bank critics in praise wrote about Biddle. Bank historian, Thomas Govan, explains that the Bank under Biddle had become a beneficial collaborator with the state banks by providing credit facilities for an expanding economy. The local banks supplied local needs and the Bank supplied the means for the internal exchanges of product throughout the country. Both benefited through this policy. In the West and South people were short on capital and lacked a stable currency, since a majority of their trade was through New Orleans and they needed a stable market for their bills of exchange. It was only the BUS, through its system of branches, that was able to provide this. Through working with the state banks he transformed what was a nationwide banking system acting as federal agent in to a sound and stable central bank.

Biddle's actions helped wipe out the many fears of these people towards the Bank. Several incidences prove that. Biddle, in 1825, through incredible foresight was able to dodge a crisis that could have been greater or equal to the Panic of 1819. In Missouri a sizable pro-Bank group was strong enough to elect congressional representative Ashley who ran against a pro-Benton candidate. The suffering of the Ohio Valley following the Panic of 1819 left the area in a dismal state of array, but by the mid-1820s this region had emerged as a fast growing, prosperous part of the county thanks to the Bank. In Cincinnati two papers that were vehemently opposed to the Bank became pro-Bank. By the late 1820s, thanks to Biddle, the Bank regained the trust of this area and had accomplished the task it was meant to do; establish a sound uniform currency. The excellent management quieted the complaints against the Bank from 1823-1829.

The era of good feelings changed in 1828 when Andrew Jackson was elected to the presidency. As Jackson began his term in 1829 some Americans had fears about what this bad tempered, Indian killing, uneducated Westerner might do in office. No one ever believed that he would set out to destroy the Second Bank of the United States. Jackson, it should be noted, had strong opinions against all banks and the entire mercantile and credit system long before becoming president. In 1790s Jackson began to dabble in land speculation. In 1796 Jackson sold fifty acres of land to David Allison, a Philadelphia merchant. Allison, to cover the cost of the land, paid Jackson in bank notes. Jackson, with notes in hand, opened a trading post on the Cumberland River in his home state of Tennessee. To pay for his needed supplies Jackson signed over the bank notes to his suppliers. Then in the fall of 1797 Jackson received the unfortunate news that Allison had gone bankrupt and it was up to Jackson to make good on the now worthless notes. To escape bankruptcy himself Jackson sold his store and land at far below their value. From that point on he viewed paper money as instruments of swindlers and cheats preying on the innocent and honest. Specie, gold and silver, was the only money for honest people.

No sooner than taking office Jackson surrounded himself with advisers had that helped him win the White House. While some of these men were in Jackson’s official cabinet most were part of the unofficial cabinet dubbed the "Kitchen Cabinet". The foremost of these men were: Amos Kendal, Francis P. Blair who was chosen to edit the mouthpiece of the party The Washington Globe, Thomas H. Benton, who because of his hard money beliefs, was nick named "Old Bullion" and Jackson’s power in the Senate and lastly Martin Van Buren of New York, Jackson’s first Secretary of State then Vice President and Jackson’s successor in the White House. Van Buren brought with him the Wall Street bankers' jealous opinion that New York not Philadelphia should be the Banking center of the country. These men shared similar opinions on the welfare of the Union as did Jackson. Though his opinions towards the Bank were never mentioned in his Inaugural Address, Jackson let the country know his feelings in his annual address to Congress in December 1829.

When Jackson’s message was first being drafted Van Buren called Alexander Hamilton Jr., son of the creator of the First National Bank, to refine the President’s speech. While looking over the speech Hamilton was surprised to see a work that was done in "different hands" which attacked the Bank in great length in a loose newspaper slashing style. Hamilton suggested that the Bank not be mentioned in the upcoming address. Jackson thanked Hamilton for his advice, but in his speech still included the paragraph against the Bank. In the Address he questioned the constitutionality of the Bank saying that the Bank was "well questioned by a large portion of our fellow-citizens," and that the bank had, "failed in the great end to establish a uniform and sound currency." He further recommended that Congress should consider a new national bank "founded upon the credit of the government and its revenues." Benton mentions that the speech did little to arouse public interest, but what little it did was among the Bank’s friends.

Why the sudden attack on the Bank? It had been almost six months since Jackson's inauguration and never once during that time did he publicly question the Bank. In the later years of the Bank War one senator maintained that Jackson turned on the Bank because he found that it couldn’t be used for his own political ends. Jackson then condemned the charge as "one of the foulest and basest calumnies ever uttered." Was it? In June 1829 mismanagement charges were brought against the Portsmouth, New Hampshire branch President, Jeremiah Mason, by Kitchen Cabinet member Isaac Hill. Hill wrote Biddle that Mason had been refusing loans to Jackson’s friends as well as interfering in the local elections of Democrats. The belief was that Hill wanted Mason removed to either gain political control of the branch or for his inability to get a loan. While this correspondence was happening, Secretary of War, John Eaton, ordered the Revolutionary War pensions, which were held at the Portsmouth branch, to be removed and be transferred to the Bank at Concord. Biddle did not hesitate to inform the Secretary that the directors of the Bank of the United States and its branches were responsible only to Congress and was shielded by its charter from executive control and acknowledged not the slightest responsibility to him. Happy with Mason’s ability in managing the Bank, Biddle cleared him of all charges and wrote, "I can now say with the up most confidence that the whole is a paltry intrigue got up by a combination of small bankrupts and smaller Demagogues-if the choice were to be made again, we ought to choose Mr. Mason." On September 15th Biddle wrote to Hill that the charges were groundless and that Mason had been re-instated.

While Biddle’s stand with the Portsmouth incident can be justified, his case was injured by writing too much and for being unseemingly arrogant when arguing his case. Seeing how he might have damaged the President’s opinion towards the Bank, he quickly changed his tone and throughout the summer and fall of 1829 Biddle made every effort to reconcile with the Office. Biddle wrote to all branches that the Bank was to keep out of all local political races of that year. He also met with the President personally to inform the Chief Executive that the national debt would be paid off by 1833, a symbolic date that would please the General. This was the anniversary of the General’s victory in New Orleans. It was at this meeting where Jackson told Biddle about his mistrust not just in the BUS but in all banks. "I do not dislike your bank any more than all banks," he said, "but ever since I have read the history of the South Sea Bubble I have been afraid of all banks." The South Sea Bubble referred to the near collapse of the British economy due to over speculation. Jackson did tell of his satisfaction with Biddle and would mention that in his next address to Congress. Biddle left the meeting with the feeling of relief that the Bank question was solved.

Biddle and the Bank’s friends were therefore shocked by the President’s negative message. Immediately Biddle became alarmed. To Biddle it was fine for Jackson to have his opinion about the constitutionality of the Bank. This was already decided by the Marshall Court and for the years after the decision had been an accepted fact. It had been years since anyone had seriously challenged the Bank. He felt that it was an absurd matter to call into question. But for the General to attack the soundness of the Bank’s currency was unfounded. At the time of the message the dollar was sound and very stable. As to the suggestion of Jackson's national bank idea Biddle felt the it was "an opinion of the President alone, a personal measure, therefore not as dangerous to the Bank if it had came form the party or the cabinet."

After the delivery of the President’s Message to Congress the questions referring to the BUS were given to the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives to evaluated the Bank. When the committee examined the speech they couldn’t agree with the President. The Committee led by George McDuffie of South Carolina declared that the President’s statements about the Bank made no sense. In his report he made note that when there was some form of central bank that the country’s public and private credit had been maintained to an unequal stability for 33 out of 40 years . The report expressed that the paper currency in some parts of the country was at the time more valuable then specie. McDuffie, who was a bullionist by thought but also a realist, realized that a country that only used metallic currency was severally limited. He mentioned the Bank’s regulatory practices over the state banks to keep their money honest and without that the country might revert to the bank practices before the War of 1812.

The committee was also unanimous on the government bank. That bank, they thought, was not only impracticable but also it was believed to be unnecessary. When the Ways and Means Committee came to the paragraph concerning the alternative bank they could hardly take Jackson seriously. The President presented no clear plan for a new bank nor did he recommend one to Congress. Usually it was the Secretary of the Treasury’s report to Congress which would be the vehicle for such proposals. But in Secretary Ingham’s report he never once mentioned the Second Bank or Jackson’s criticism of it. The Committee believed that the BUS had effectively provided the Government perfectly to all matters of finance and state and rejected the motion. They did, however, comment on Jackson’s "disinterested patriotism" and "exalted character." Jackson, after hearing the report, was furious and was positive that somehow Biddle used his Bank influence over the committee. Jackson was now more convinced than ever that the Bank was a "hydra of corruption and that it must be destroyed."

Throughout the next year Jackson was relatively quiet concerning the Bank of the United States. In 1829 the President fell deathly ill and spent the winter regaining his health, which diverted his attention from the Bank. In early spring of 1830 he began to recover and spent his time consternating on the Indian removal issue. Jackson, who was known to fight one battle at a time, was more intent on the passage of his Indian removal bill and for this he limited his remarks to the Bank as vague references. When it seemed that his Indian plan would pass, Jackson then returned to his attack on the Bank in his 1830 address to Congress.

The speech attacked the Bank more harshly then the year before. He said, "nothing had diminished the dangers, which many of our citizens apprehended from that institution as at present organized." During his illness Jackson began to refine his alternative bank plan. He proposed that the substitute would have few officers and no stockholders. His national bank could not make loans and because of this "the States would be strengthened by having in their hands the means of furnishing local paper currency through their own banks, while the Bank of the Untied States, though issuing no paper, would check the issues of the State banks by taking in their notes in deposit and for exchange only so long as they continue to be redeemed for specie." Since this was not a corporate body and no stockholders it would not be "obnoxious to the constitutional objections which are urged against the president bank." The bank could make no loans or have any debtors. He wanted all directors of his bank to be appointed annually by the President of the United States with the consent of Congress. When writing the speech Jackson explained his bank to Secretary of the Treasury Ingham, who thought that the bank would become too political. He believed that the directors would be too heavily controlled by the President’s wishes. He asked the General not to mention the substitute bank plan until further notice. Even good friend Amos Kendall refused to support such a plan. Not listening to the advice of his friends Jackson did include a paragraph on his substitute bank in his message to Congress.

When Biddle heard the message he became increasingly worried. He feared that "by inviting the State Governments to strengthen themselves by usurping the whole circulating medium of the country he will probably excite them to instruct their delegations in Congress to oppose the charter." Though the President’s message did scare Biddle and his supporters it did hint at way of solving the Bank problem. The address clearly expressed the President’s willingness to compromise on the Bank issue if some type of modifications could be approved. Jackson was still even with his humble backgrounds a politician and politicians work with flexible guidelines.

Then in early 1831 Biddle was struck by heavenly luck. Jackson’s cabinet was dissolved when the social bickering of Mrs. Calhoun about Secretary of the Navy John Eaton’s wife’s less than scrupulous past tore a chasm between Vice President John C. Calhoun and the other members. After the breakup Biddle was elated with Jackson’s replacements since most of whom, except Roger Taney, the Attorney General, were in favor of keeping the present national bank. The new Secretary of Treasury, Louis McLane and Edward Livingston, Secretary of State, were both defenders and friends to the Bank. For the past two years Biddle had endured countless attacks towards his bank and as if over night these fears were extinguished.

These men, no sooner than taking office, began to work on a plan that would modify the structure and powers of the Bank to make it more acceptable to its opponents and overcome Jackson’s objections of constitutionality. They proposed to retain the five Government directors on the board, but sell the Government stock in the Bank to the public. The moneys earned from this would help settle the national debt. The Bank could no longer use branch drafts in favor of a currency to be issued by the main bank. There could only be a limit of two banks in each state and the real estate holdings in the states would be limited.

Jackson agreed with the compromise. With the upcoming election Jackson wanted to keep the Bank issue from hurting his chances of securing more votes then in 1828. The last thing he wanted after the embarrassing break up of the Cabinet was another scandal or quarrelsome issues that could be avoided especially when those issues were dividing the party. To make his wishes known to Biddle, Jackson encouraged a meeting between McLane and Biddle. In October the two met in Philadelphia. McLane told Biddle that the President’s views towards the Bank had not changed despite the new Cabinet. But, anxious to keep the Bank question out of the campaign, Jackson had agreed to omit all references to the Bank out of the upcoming annual address to Congress. Biddle feared that not mentioning the Bank in the speech would be a mistake. Biddle suggested a judicious mention would be preferable to silence. Biddle then dictated that part of the message. The President, he said, should avoid the repetition of his criticism as in the previous messages and that "his silence would not be so useful as his mentioning the subject." McLane then gave a list of modifications of the charter that were authorized by Jackson and to which Biddle agreed. It would have appeared that a compromise had been made and the Bank question solved. Jackson had a guarantee of postponement until after the election and Biddle had the breadth of assurance that his Bank would be re-chartered.

Early in December the Cabinet assembled to hear the first draft of the President’s annual message. Jackson heard McLane’s suggestions on how the Bank should be mentioned, but the General decided to mention it in his own way. After reading his passage about the Bank a silence followed and there seemed to be a unanimous approval until Taney remarked that the language might suggest that the President had become favorable to the Bank. McLane and Livingston denied this. After some bickering the President interrupted to say that he did not imply that he would sign any bill that Congress might pass nor did he mean that he would veto any bill. Taney left the meeting feeling that the influence of "Chestnut Street" had been too much for him.

The President’s third annual address to Congress on December 6, 1831 made rather tame references to the Bank, but it was Louis McLane's treasury report that created a sensation. McLane’s report gave nothing but praise to the Bank and recommended the renewal of its charter. The editors of the Intelligencer could recall no executive report that had ever created a sensation like it. "For ourselves we have not been able to draw a long breath since we read it," they wrote. The ultra-Jeffersonian editor of the Richmond Enquirer, Thomas Ritchie, exclaimed that although he could not fully agree with the report, it was the boldest and most original report to have come from the Treasury in 30 years. The happiest of all was Nicholas Biddle. He assumed that McLane would not have been allowed to write such a report on so important a subject without the approval of Jackson. Biddle wrote to the Treasury Department praising McLane by saying, "Mr. McLane's report is like all his friends could wish--enlarged, liberal, wise, and statesmanlike." Finally almost two years of political fighting at last ended with both sides content. All was good in Washington but not completely happy.

Bank friend and defender, Henry Clay, was especially disturbed to hear of the compromise. Clay, who was just nominated for the presidency by his party, the National Republicans, had committed himself and the party to a campaign against Jackson’s hostility to the Bank. At the National Republican convention the party condemned Jackson as being a foe of the Bank. "Address of the People", a pamphlet distributed at the convention, attacked Jackson for his failures as president "by education and character unfit for office." Upon returning to Washington, Clay notified Biddle that he believed that the Bank should ask for re-charter at this session of Congress. "The friends of the Bank are here, with whom I have conversed, seem to expect the application to be made." Clay believed that "if the President approved the bill, he would loose the support of those of his party, who had approved his opposition to the Bank," or if he vetoed the bill, "he would loose Pennsylvania and the election." Pennsylvania, for almost 40 years had generally forecasted the outcome of elections. Clay warned Biddle that his own belief is that "if now called upon he would not negative the bill; but that if he should be re-elected the event might and probably be different." Clay’s advice ruthlessly brushed aside the compromise proposed by McLane for his own political agenda.

Confused by the different opinions presented to him and not fully trusting Clay’s reasoning, Biddle sent good friend Thomas Cadwalader to investigate the Bank’s support in Congress. For the next six days, December 20 to December 27, Cadwalader kept close contact with Biddle on his findings. McLane warned that if the re-charter was asked for at this session that the President would certainly veto it. But after a triumphant re-election the situation would be different. "What I see of Gen. Jackson I think he would be more disposed to yield when he is strong than when he is in danger." A day later Cadwalader recovered from the discouraging conversation with McLane when he talked to McDuffie. McDuffie believed there to be more than enough votes for the bill to pass and quite possible enough support to override a veto.

By the time Cadwalader returned home Biddle was all but determined to seek a re-charter. The decisive point with him was the report that Cadwalader wrote on December 26 and his second meeting with McLane. Cadwalader went to visit McLane after he had heard the Secretary had taken ill. The Bank emissary found McLane so anxious to talk about the Bank business that he saw Cadwalader in his bedroom, to which he was confined. During the long talk McLane assured Cadwalader that he would not be angry, but would do his best to assure the success, if Biddle, against his advise, went ahead with the re-charter. Seeing the truth in his emissary’s investigation Biddle and his directors drew up a memorial asking for re-charter and forwarded it to Congress on January 6, 1832.

When the issue of the re-charter was being debated in Congress, Senator Benton accused the Bank of several violations of its charter and attacked the Bank for some real and imaginary wrong doings. The bank draft system was the major violation of his claims. These were branch drafts made of small denominations circulating like bank notes but had none of the marks of convertible bank notes. Payment on them could be voluntary at the branch banks. If payment was refused, however, the owner of the notes could only go to the mother bank to redeem them. Benton accused the Bank of only issuing these bank drafts in the most isolated areas of the country so that the owner had no choice to make the long journey to Philadelphia. And being that they were of only small denominations, these notes "lingered in the hands of the laboring people until the "ware and tare" became a large item of gain to the Bank, and the difficulty of presenting them at Philadelphia an effectual bar to their payment there." While this claim of Benton’s could be true, it should be said that all banks, state or national, used the bank draft system since the beginning of the century. These notes were supposed to stay in circulation only to be redeemed when the paper could no longer survive in circulation. But in their issue the Bank laid itself open to the attack and an investigation into these practices was started.

The Senator’s attack caught the Bank off guard. To agree to the investigation the Bank would be fighting a defensive battle; to oppose the inquiry would be admitting guilt. There was nothing to do but to proceed with the investigation. For the next six weeks a congressional committee evaluated the Bank's past practices. While defending the draft issue, Biddle's self-satisfaction of his own power led him into making unwise remarks about the great power the Bank had over local banks and the general prosperity of the country. Biddle may have said this as to assure that the Bank was a restraining power and not using this power to the disadvantage of the public played into Benton’s hands. "A power to injure or destroy," Benton later wrote in his autobiography, "might be used for evil as well as for good; and was a power too large to be trusted to one man." But the ill-prepared committee could not handle the massive amounts of abstract data the Bank threw upon them, in what it would seem to confuse the members. These men concluded that the Bank was cleared of any wrong doings. With the interrogation over, Biddle prepared to drive the bill through Congress. Several amendments to the existing charter were incorporated--all keeping with Jackson’s proposed ideas. On March 13, Senator Dallas brought in the bill from his committee for the re-charter of the Bank for fifteen years from its existing charter in 1836. In July it passed both houses. Jackson was surprised to see that members of his own party broke ranks to support the bill and suggested that if the President vetoed the bill it should be a moderate one that would still leave the bank open for further debate after the election.

Jackson had decided to return the bill with an uncompromising veto and summoned his Cabinet. It is believed that while some ideas were contributed by, Livingston, Taney, Benton and Jackson, the body and framing of the veto was done solely by Amos Kendall. While the veto was being finalized Van Buren who had just arrived from London stopped to visit the President only to find a ghost of a man. Jackson was not known to handle the intense July heat in Washington. Jackson who was happy to see his friend said, "the Bank Mr. Van Buren is trying to kill me but I will kill it!" On July 10 he did. The veto message was, as one historian wrote, "a curious pot-porurri of strengths and weaknesses, of sound statesmanship and cheap demagogism, of shrewd politics and silly common places." But, the message also contained sound and cohesive arguments against the constitutionality of the Bank, its monopolistic powers, the fear of foreign powers controlling the Bank stock and the fear that so few should command such a dominating power. Although none of the messages that were argued in the veto were new to the controversy, they did, however, present the old arguments best for popular effect. This was written not to appeal to the Congress, but to the masses so that even the most illiterate could not fail to grasp the message. It was, of course, a campaign document and it was intended to be such.

Jackson’s veto stated, "Distinctions in society will always exist under every government…." "…but when laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages, artificial distinctions... ...to make the rich richer..." The veto appealed to the most patriotic of Americans to the poorest of citizen. The Bank, Jackson implied, was a vehicle of aristocracy and the symbol of the social privilege. Worse still the Bank was a manipulative tool of European capitalists. Jackson said that this foreign influence was dangerous in peace as well in war. How he saw this as a danger was never explained. The Bank’s charter limited the voting influence of foreign stockholders to almost nothing. It would seem almost as beneficial to keep the enemies' money in the country. Jackson in calling forth his former objections to the Bank through his veto noted the Supreme Court decision of McCullach v. Maryland. "To this conclusion I cannot assent," he declared and elaborated that the Congress, the President and the Court must, "be guided by its own opinion of the constitution…Each public officer who takes an oath to support the constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it not as it is understood by others."

The Jacksonian Democrats hailed the veto as a second Declaration of Independence against the aristocratic elite of the country. The National- Republicans obviously discredited it. Clay in his speech to Congress to override the presidential veto he said, "the veto is an extraordinary power not to be used in ordinary cases…if to be used at all." Clay felt that through the veto the President might effectively intrude into the legislative process and then force his will on Congress. He mentioned that Jackson had vetoed on bills twelve times that he regarded unnecessary, while all the past presidents only used the power a total of nine times. "As to the veto message," wrote Biddle, "I am delighted with it. It has all the fury of the unchained panther, biting at the bars of his cage…and it is my hope that it will contribute to relive the country from the domination of these miserable people." The override was unable to pass the Congress and now lines were drawn for the up coming election either the country was for Jackson or the Bank.

Now the question remains as to who was at fault for the Bank’s uncompromising veto. While it is safe to say that Jackson and Biddle both held some part of the blame, it is hard to conclude which side had the most even when looking at the historical evidence. While most historians place the blame with Biddle, he cannot take all of the credit. One historian puts the blame solely on Biddle for not making the Bank an issue in the 1828 election. Biddle did love to play the role of a banker, a job he did exceedingly well, but he never did let the power of this institution take control of him. When Jackson was elected and made his attack against the Bank, Biddle panicked. The President threatened the Bank that Biddle built. Biddle considered that it was his practices that brought the economy out of the hardships of the 1819 panic into not just a stable economy, but the strongest economy the country had ever been. He did this because he, unlike Cheves, saw the Bank and its note issuing power as what they should have been; a monetary tool used not to be paid and converted into coin, but as a vehicle to make purchases. If the farmer paid the merchant for something bought why then shouldn’t the merchant then use the money to buy his own needs for inventory. It was when the notes were redeemed for coin did the notes lost their value because of the discounts placed by banks. Some state banks charged as much as a 10% discount on other banks’ notes so if a person had a bank note for $100 he would get $90 in coin. He manage to win the opinion of the public by forcing that at all times the branches of the Bank would have at least 25% to 45% of specie on hand in relevance to issued notes in comparison to the 7% to 15% the state banks had. Biddle's policies increased their use but it did not increase the demand for the Bank to redeem them. By 1830 only a quarter of the national currency was BUS notes; and to what Jacksonian called the "monster" of rag money was the nations most honest currency, or based on more specie than would have otherwise been the case.

When Biddle petitioned the Congress for re-charter he expressed that he had no concerns of the politics involved in the up-coming election. What he cared about was his Bank. While his meetings with McLane should have suggested a compromising President’s promise to re-charter after the election, but should the honorable General Jackson be trusted? This was a fear that plagued Biddle. Numerous times the General had given his word on matters of state only to go back on them when his will moved him. It happened once before with Biddle. There was always the chance when and if Jackson was re-elected that there was nothing to stop him from going back on his word. When the Bank was thrown into the election Biddle had believed that the citizens would see the necessity of the bank and vote against Jackson. But Biddle was ignorant of the country outside of New England and the aristocratic east where Jackson had the largest support. These people voted for Jackson, not because of his political ideas, but because he was one of them.

The veto of the Bank of the United States was within Jackson’s rights as President, but his economic reasoning for issuing it was not. Throughout his first term in office he never once felt the need for the Bank. He reasoned that it was unconstitutional, a monopoly, and most of all that the Bank never produced a uniform currency. In his first annual address to Congress he laid forth all his objections towards the Bank but never backed any of his attacks with solid facts. He mentioned in this address that many people in the country still questioned the Bank’s constitutionality, but never explain who these people were. Looking at the Bank's past history would suggest that these were objections from the West. The West had begun to prosper under Biddle’s Bank. After Jackson’s first address Kentucky, Ohio and Jackson's home state of Tennessee sent petitions to the White House expressing the necessity of the Bank in that part of the country. The Bank gave much of this area solid credit and in most parts Bank notes were the only form of circulating currency. Without the Bank’s loans to the West, land improvements would greatly be reduced. Jackson ignored such pleas, still under the delusion that the Bank was monster to the country and attacked once more in 1830.

When his Cabinet broke up in 1831, no longer was Jackson surrounded by, what could be seen as, his henchmen. Most of the men now in the cabinet were not hostile towards the Bank and would not support actions that would hurt it. These men weren’t ignorant of the President’s disapproval of the existing Bank and wrote new amendments to make the Bank more to the President’s liking. When Biddle saw these new improvements, he also agreed. So if all was agreed upon why would Jackson veto the Bank bill that was submitted with a majority of the mutually approved amendments? Biddle went against the General’s wishes. Because of what Jackson called treachery against his honor the Bank was killed. Jackson’s major flaw was his stubborn personality and his uncontrollable temper. He was know to foam at the mouth spraying his spittle everywhere like a wild beast when his temper got away from him.

While Jackson's political thought was central to the Bank War, obvious personal grievances where present. The Jacksonian Revolution began when this strong determined President stormed the White House and brought new ideas of the American political structure with him. He had the Western resentment towards the Bank as a financial institution and the Southerner's view of its constitutionality. He attacked the Bank as a government sanctioned monopoly and for with which he didn’t agree. He used his agrarian background to appeal to the every-day citizens of the country who were uneducated to the banking system. These people didn’t understand the credit power of the Bank. Jackson said that the Bank kept the honest American worker and farmer poor while the rich got richer off their profits. When the Bank finally died in 1836, the country remained with the status quo. These poor farmers never shared the benefits from the destruction of the Bank, they still were poor and only the President’s friends reaped the rewards.