Louis McLANE TO Biddle

Washington Jan. 5. 1832 Dear Sir,

General Cadwalader has returned to Philadelphia, and I apprehend with impressions, favorable to an attempt to renew the charter of the Bank of the United States at the present session of Congress. When he consulted me upon the subject soon after his arrival here, I frankly & distinctly discouraged the attempt and on grounds which I believe well entitled to weight. Other Counsels however, and, as I think too sanguine expectations of support from Congress, appear to have had greater influence: and it has occurred to me as proper that I should communicate my opinions directly to you.

I do not profess to be in a situation to become the adviser of the Bank, and I desire to be irresponsible for the future decision of the Directors and the stockholders. The position I occupy in the Government, however, and that in which the late annual report which my sense of public duty constrained me to make has placed me in relation to the Bank and may possibly place me in relation to any immediate attempt to renew the Charter, make it necessary for me to prevent misapprehension from any quarter distinctly to state my own opinions. This will at least leave me uncommitted for the future whatever weight may be given to my views.

I feel constrained therefore to say that I am decidedly opposed, both on principle and on grounds of expediency, to an attempt to renew the Charter of the Bank during the present Congress.

The annual report, for the reasons stated in it, recommends the renewal of the charter "at the proper time" thereby obviously excluding any premature renewal which should be inconsistent with the principle and term of the charter and not necessary to the safety of the stockholders, or the interests of the debtors and convenience of the community at large.

The charter of the Bank will not expire until one year after the termination of the next Congress: before that period Congress has no authority, without the consent of the Stockholders, to alter its provisions; and a law passed in the interim can only take effect after the expiration of the present charter.

Unless it could be shown that all the remaining period of the charter is necessary to accommodate the business of the Bank to the ultimate decision of the Government this would be no just pretence for requiring that decision at this time, and perhaps no greater motive for doing so than there was during the last session. To me there appears to be no such necessity;

and it does not follow that those friendly to the institution could be expected to make their final decision at this time.

In the case of such a Corporation as that of the Bank of the United States the Government is entitled to so much of the term of the Charter for the benefit of full experience and of amply taking the good management of the corporation, as may be consistent with the public interest. Independently of this right a subject on which there is so great a diversity in public opinion, involving so many important interests of all classes of the community, and which has already attracted a large portion of public attention should not be disposed of without again affording an opportunity of a distinct expression of the will of the people. The present Congress has not been chosen with any direct reference to this question, and there are no constitutional means of ascertaining the sense of the people before the elections preparatory to the 23d. Congress. Favorable as I am to the continuance of the Bank, if I could be persuaded that a decided majority of the people of the United States were certainly opposed to re-chartering it as at present organized, I could not consent, with the principle of Government which I hold, to forestall, by any premature action, the force of public sentiment, or to exclude the advantage of other counsels with a fuller knowledge of the subject.

It must be obvious that both the interests of the present Banks and the general expediency of such an institution require that the consideration of the subject should be separate from party questions, with which it has properly no concern;

and it is equally clear that in the present state of political parties, whatever may be the motive of the friends of the Bank, it must undoubtedly be mixed up with topics altogether unfavorable to a dispassionate judgement.

It is not unreasonable to infer that these considerations will have their weight with the members of the present Congress;

who will see nothing in a refusal to legislate at present inconsistent with the maintenance of their own views under more favorable circumstances.

I have no right, nor do I profess in any manner, to speak for the President; his opinions are before the Country in his official messages in each of which he has invited the People of the United States to an investigation of the subject. But independently of the views he has heretofore avowed, and however they might be ultimately affected by a deliberate expression of the will of a decided majority of the People of the U.S. it would be unreasonable to expect that he could now consent finally to foreclose the investigation which he himself has invited, before the public sense has been constitutionally declared ascertained.

For myself I must say that holding the principles I do and have here expressed, as one of the constitutional advisers of the President I could not consistently interpose an objection to the exercise of his negative upon a bill rechartering the Bank during the present Congress, unless presented to him as one of and in connection with a series of measures for adjusting, upon principles of compromise, all the great interests of the Country.

I deem it unnecessary to repeat my opinion of the expediency or necessity of a National Bank on the grounds and for the purposes I have heretofore publicly stated, but I will not disguise the solicitude I feel lest any premature attempts to re-charter the present Bank by exposing it to the influence of party feeling and prejudice, should hereafter encourage the preference to an entirely new institution.